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We have been glad to see that our paper (Scherrer and Jost
2007) solicited such insightful or supportive commentaries
as those of Noble, of Gros, of Prohaska and Stadler, of
Forsdyke, and Billeter, as well as the alternative proposal
of Stadler et al., and we hope that this will trigger further
conceptual discussions about the deﬁnition of the gene and
inspire further research about programs of gene expression,
in the light of recent advances in molecular biology and
bioinformatics (Billeter 2009; Forsdyke 2009; Gros 2009;
Noble 2009; Prohaska and Stadler 2008; Stadler et al.
2009). The commentaries raise some important issues. We
agree with some of them, but disagree with others, whereas
still others reﬂect terminological decisions that could be
taken so or otherwise. In the sequel, we shall try to address
these issues in a systematic manner and motivate the ter-
minological decisions that we have taken. This will also
give us the opportunity to emphasize some points that were
not explicitly laid out in our original paper.
Since the initial work of Gregor Mendel in the middle of
the nineteenth century and the introduction of the term
Gene by Wilhelm Johannsen in 1909, the basic idea of the
concept was to express a discrete unit of a heritable phe-
notypic property, or perhaps better, a heritable unit of some
discrete phenotypic property. As a discrete unit, it can be
modiﬁed by discrete events, the mutations. The units are
passed on to offspring in sexual reproduction via
recombination. They are not inherited entirely indepen-
dently, but the phenomenon of genetic linkage suggested
already to Thomas Morgan a linear arrangement. As
became clear with the advances of biochemistry, what is
inherited is not the trait itself, but rather pieces of DNA that
encode information about the biochemical substrate and for
the production of that phenotypic trait under speciﬁc intra-
and extracellular circumstances. Since about 1960, those
pieces of DNA were often taken for the genes themselves,
and these genetic data then are annotated in the framework
of––more or less––suitable ontologies. The phenotypic
traits themselves are caused by proteins that themselves are
complexes of polypeptides, or complexes of proteins, or by
other functional molecules in the cell among which small
functional RNAs are presently receiving particular atten-
tion. In order to account for emerging biological com-
plexity, the deﬁnition of the gene has undergone several
substantial changes over the last 100 years. Nevertheless,
(Gerstein et al. 2007) request that an updated deﬁnition of
the gene should attempt to be backward compatible with
the earlier ones. For us, this means that we should address
the three issues of inheritance, coding, and function that in
one way or another underly all thinking about the gene
concept, and analyze how or to what degree earlier models
are compatible with present molecular biological knowl-
edge and experimental and bioinformatical capabilities.
In our paper, we have therefore analyzed the difﬁculties
of previous gene deﬁnitions and proposed one that takes
the above requirements into account to a degree that is
feasible, compatible with present molecular biological and
bioinformatical knowledge, and logically consistent. With
this aim we have separated product information (the gene)
from information regulating its expression; to designate
this program the term of genon was introduced. We should
also emphasize that our concepts of gene and genon are
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recent progress in understanding eukaryotic gene regula-
tion. Therefore, our concepts do need certain modiﬁcations
or adaptations when applied to prokaryotes, as we hope to
develop in a future paper.
Clearly, the gene is one of the most basic concepts of
biology, perhaps the fundamental concept that constitutes
biology as a science different from chemistry. The rough
idea underlying classical gene concepts, as brieﬂy sum-
marized above, was that some structure that can be inher-
ited or is transmitted to offspring by structure copying
encodes some biological function. Consequently, a gene
should be neither viewed as a structure nor as a function
exclusively but, because what is at stake is a relation
between a structure and a function. This relation includes
the information for a product, at the basis of a function, as
well as for the regulative program governing its expression.
Therefore, we do not see why we should be forced into the
alternative developed by Prohaska and Stadler between a
structural and a functional gene deﬁnition. In any case, a
purely structural deﬁnition would risk to only capture the
molecular aspects, and not arrive at what makes a cell a
biological system. An exclusively functional deﬁnition, in
contrast, would forget that the functions are coded for by
heritable structures.
Modern molecular biology has shown, however, that
this relationship between structure and function is not as
straightforward as originally thought. While it is a testi-
mony to the genius of Gregor Mendel that he arrived at the
essence of this relationship, this has the consequence that a
modern gene deﬁnition can no longer be as easy or simple
as originally thought. The structure that is inherited has to
be transformed by speciﬁc programs into the structure that
encodes a function. This transformation is complex, but we
try to capture its essence by the genon concept. It seems to
us that this concept captures the essential aspect of gene
regulation much better than the general distinction between
inputs and parameters suggested by Stadler et al. because it
separates information for products and programs necessary
for their expression.
As Forsdyke points out, mutations can yield some dis-
criminatory criterion, in the sense that whether some piece
of structure contributes to a gene can be checked by
whether the function of that gene will be affected by a
mutation of the structure. He quotes many good examples,
but in our opinion, his examples precisely suggest that one
should distinguish between those mutations that change the
functional product by varying the coding information and
those that affect the programs of its expression. In our
terminology, a mutation can change a gene or affect its
genon. In principle, a single mutation could also do both, as
the genon motives can be superimposed onto the coding
sequence. From our point of view, however, this distinction
between the two possible effects of a mutation is funda-
mental. Therefore, we ﬁnd that our distinction between
product and program is at the same time conceptually
simpler and offers deeper insight into what is really at stake
than his suggestion to deﬁne a gene at 3 levels [(1) The
DNA sequence that is transcribed. (2) The latter plus the
immediate 50 and 30 sequences that, when mutated, spe-
ciﬁcally affect the function. (3) The latter two, plus any
remote sequences that, when mutated, speciﬁcally affect
the function]. His 3 levels may be well designed for his
mutation test, but do not distinguish between the two dif-
ferent possible (but not necessarily mutually exclusive)
effects of mutations that we want to distinguish.
The discussion by Forsdyke of ‘‘placeholder-bases’’ in
the genetic material is appreciated as it nicely illustrates
and complements an important point underlying our genon
concept. A particularly pertinent example of Forsdyke is
the occurrence of glycine–alanine repeats in an EPV pro-
tein without inﬂuence on the amino acid sequence that,
however, interferes with antigen processing. This might be
a perfect example of mutation in the program of the genon;
in this case program information seems to have preference
over product information. Somehow the effect on antigen
processing may play not on gene function but on when,
where and how the same protein has to be made. He also
points out the existence of mutations beyond the apparently
transcribed areas which do not bear on the protein product.
At this point, we remind the reader that the transcribed area
no longer seems to correspond and, in fact, never did
correspond to the areas designated by ordinary Northern
blot and microarray techniques. The ENCODE project has
shown that most of the genome is transcribed, as we
already pointed out in our paper on the base of earlier data
but, furthermore, the recently developed technique of
RNA-Seq show that all the upstream and downstream areas
Forsdyke is talking about are transcribed after all. Indeed, it
is likely that most of the attachment sites of transcription
factors are transcribed and, therefore, mutation may bear
on RNA expression and correct processing and transport of
the derived RNA at precise times and places in space. The
placeholder concept is also in line with the role of intronic
sequences and mutations therein and the fact that, in some
cases, parts of exonic sequences occur in introns, stopped
by termination codons, and that some intronic sequences
show higher conservation than the neighbouring exons. All
these phenomena can easily be attributed to the genon and
its precursors at pre-mRNA and DNA level.
In fact, in our opinion, a basic problem of earlier gene
deﬁnitions was that they neglected the expression process
that links the coding in the DNA with the functional
molecules (in a sense to be made precise below) in the cell.
In other words, previous gene deﬁnitions were about DNA
and proteins, but did not involve RNA taking part in the
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molecular biology in the sixties, a gene is a sequence
consisting of nucleotides that is either directly functional or
codes for a functional product. In the case that we have
discussed in most detail in our paper, when the functional
product is a polypeptide, the coding sequence then is
realized in the mRNA prior to its translation into the
polypeptide. This coding sequence is assembled from
transcribed fragments of DNA in a process that arises from
the interaction of factors from outside that sequence with
speciﬁc signals or motifs in the sequence to be processed
itself, the collection of which we call the pre-genon carried
by the pre-mRNA and, encoded in the corresponding
genomic domain, the information of the proto-genon. Our
central concept, the genon, is the ﬁnal product of this
process in the mature mRNA; in fact, it is the program that
controls the expression of a speciﬁc gene as a product. We
thus strictly separate information for product and regula-
tion of its expression process.
1––In that direction, we ﬁnd
the deﬁnition proposed in (Gerstein et al. 2007) of a gene
as ‘‘a union of genomic sequences encoding a coherent set
of potentially overlapping functional products’’ too vague.
If one were to adopt that deﬁnition, a gene would neither
correspond to a unit at the coding nor at the functional
level, but only relate two possibly rather diffuse sets of
biomolecules.
Concerning the expression process at molecular level,
the question of Billeter about the real length of the primary
transcripts is most pertinent in the context of actual
molecular biology and genetics. As he mentions, for a long
time the TATA box was supposed to mark the start of
transcripts. Questionable for a long time, to the same extent
as promotors and transcription factor attachment sites, the
latest results of genomics and in particular the already
mentioned ENCODE project show that genomic domains
of DNA are fully transcribed. In other terms, all these
signals including the TATA boxes, the latter being placed
immediately upstream of the ﬁrst exon of many genes, are
transcribed and may, hence, not serve as transcription
starts; deﬁned as signals involved in gene expression, they
may rather serve as sites involved in RNA processing. The
basic mechanism of full domain transcription does not
exclude that, in particular cases, mRNA-size molecules are
transcribed, as is the case of pseudo-genes inserted in the
DNA by reverse transcription or some integrated viral
genomes. Furthermore, the length of the primary tran-
scripts is not trivial in the frame of this discussion because
it deﬁnes the extent of the pre-genon. Since according to
latest results, at one time or another, 95% of the genome is
transcribed, it follows that the regulative information by far
exceeds information for products. This points to an even-
tual solution for a long-term paradox and may explain the
apparently absurd size of the eukaryotic genomes.
In order to arrive at a gene deﬁnition that on one hand
reﬂects the contribution of the expression program to the
construction of a functional product and on the other hand
is still compatible (at least to some degree) with the ori-
ginal intentions and the prior formulations of the gene
concept, we needed to put certain limits on what we count
as a gene. A basic limit is that we take into account only
events up to the synthesis of the polypeptide, as the basic
unit of function, and exclude post-translational processes
as, e.g. chemical modiﬁcation and formation of higher
order complexes, as pointed out in the commentary by
Denis Noble.
Furthermore, it is important that our concept only
reﬂects genetic (nomen est omen) inheritance, or more
precisely the transmission of genomes or parts of genomes,
including somatic modiﬁcations like methylation patterns,
and not other aspects of epigenetic inheritance in general.
This comes about because the elements that ultimately lead
to the coding sequence in the mRNA prior to translation
into a polypeptide are derived from speciﬁc nucleotides in
the DNA, as are the regulatory contributions of the genon
and its metabolic precursors. As such, that is, as constitu-
ents of a coding sequence or as contributions to its
expression materialized in the biochemical identity of
speciﬁc nucleotides, they can be transmitted to offspring by
genetic inheritance. The situation is different for the
ensemble of factors controlling a speciﬁc genon in an
mRNA, the basic transgenon, however. The latter includes
various biochemical agents that affect the expression of a
particular gene, but that need not all be genetically inher-
ited. Examples are cofactors as vitamins or metals, acting
at the level of enzymes or regulative proteins, or small
molecules acting as allosteric effectors that modify the
status of factors involved in regulation.
In any case, however, since a gene is assembled in a
sequence of steps during the expression process from
various pieces that originate from stretches of DNA, for us,
a gene, while heritable, is not a unit of inheritance in the
sense of being a unit of genetic transmission. More pre-
cisely, the precursor pieces at DNA level are inheritable,
because they are replicated in genetic transmission to off-
spring, but as the phenomena of DNA rearrangement under
the inﬂuence of antigens or other somatic effectors, or
alternative splicing show, the way how these pieces are
combined into a gene depending on the expression process
is not necessarily genetically inherited. Perhaps it is
deplorable that a gene is no longer a physical unit of
1 We note that this is a conceptual distinction, not a material one, as a
sequence of coding triplets may well be at the same time the
attachment site for some regulatory protein or RNA. We do not see a
logical problem in making such a conceptual distinction. In particular,
we prefer this to the distinction between input and parameters as
proposed by Stadler et al. which we ﬁnd too general and vague.
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believe, however, that our analysis has shown that this is
inevitable as there is no simple one-to-one correspondence
between pieces of DNA and functional molecules in the
cell. In fact, our effort centers about the problem to con-
ceptually account for the relation between the two via the
expression process, with contributions both from the ge-
non, coming from the same region in cis, and the holo-
transgenon, including all factors and inﬂuences external to
the cis region in question. In other words, one can have one
or the other, a unit of inheritance (in the sense of genetic
replication or transmission) or a unit of function (affecting
the phenotype), but not both. In the light of present
research in molecular biology, we have opted for the latter
(with an important caveat, as shall be clariﬁed below), and
not the former. Of course, there exist many examples
where a unit of inheritance is at the same time a unit of
function, like certain small RNAs, but the point is that for
understanding cellular biology, we need to separate the two
aspects. Anyway, it seems that, about this point, there is
little disagreement between Prohaska and Stadler and us.
At least, we read their proposal of genes as heritable ele-
mentary functional units in the same sense, namely, that
they think of a unit of function without implying that this
has to be a unit of inheritance at the same time. The pro-
posal of Stadler et al. to make the various fragments at
DNA level part of the deﬁnition of a gene then links the
gene deﬁnition more tightly to inheritance, but for the
reasons just described, a gene in their sense cannot be a
unit of inheritance either.
Another aspect is that, in evolution, selection operates
on phenotypic functions and not directly on replicated
molecules. Therefore, since, as we have discussed above,
function and inheritance in the sense of DNA replication
are not congruent, one might not even expect to be able to
identify a useful unit of inheritance in terms of replicated
genetic material. Recombination mixes the genetic material
of the parents, and mutations can affect individual nucle-
otides, but may also consist of large scale reorganization of
the DNA. Individual nucleotides are too small to have
functional signiﬁcance by themselves, and also, changes of
individual nucleotides, as well as other mutations, may be
functionally neutral. In order to reconcile our deﬁnition of
a gene as the sequence coding for a function with the issue
of replication of DNA which is important for phylogenetic
analysis, we could in principle project the coding sequence
at mRNA level back to the DNA. In that case, a gene would
become a collection of DNA fragments that can be bound
together through an expression process in a coding mRNA,
or some other functional RNA. Because of alternative
splicing and other phenomena, different such genes would
in general not be materially disjoint, but rather overlap. We
have therefore refrained from taking that step, but our
analysis has developed the tools for such backtracking, that
is, for relating a coding or functional RNA and its corre-
sponding pieces of DNA.
The alternative proposal of Stadler et al. to include in
the deﬁnition of a gene not only the function, but also what
they call the genomic footprint, that is, the fragments at
DNA level out of which the functional sequence is
assembled during the expression process is certainly worth
of a careful consideration. We have opted instead to make
this assembly part of our analysis instead of our gene
deﬁnition. In fact, we distinguish between the forward
analysis of what becomes of a fragment at DNA level, that
is, in which functional products it can be represented how
often, and the backward analysis of tracing the origins at
DNA level of the coding sequence at mRNA level
underlying a gene; backward analysis allows us also to
trace back programming information contained in the ge-
non. Either choice seems reasonable to us. Stadler et al.
achieve a really comprehensive gene concept, which,
however, may be somewhat complex in practice, whereas
ours may allow for a more ﬂexible analysis and easier
application of information theory as we have described in
our paper.
In any case, our conceptual scheme also leads to the
question whether there do exist mechanisms that ensure the
coordinated transmission of all those pieces and regulatory
motives at DNA level that together constitute a gene and its
genon. At pre-genon level the question arises as to the
evolutionary signiﬁcance of bundles of genes co-tran-
scribed into one pre-mRNA and separated by differential
processing. We are presently investigating this question.
On one hand, we study combinatorial mechanisms for the
coordinated expression of speciﬁc sets of genes. On the
other hand, we develop new conceptual tools for analyzing
the regulatory and functional signiﬁcance of spatial
arrangements.
Still another, at least equally important, limit that we
had to impose concerns what we count as a basic function
in our deﬁnition. Stadler et al. propose a general deﬁnition
for the function of an object (a biomolecule in the case of
interest here) as the set of input–output relations, or more
precisely, transformations, in which it participates as a
parameter. One then has to be careful to avoid circularity
resulting from deﬁning a parameter in terms of its functions
in input–output processes. Stadler et al. distinguish inputs
as being traces of encoded output letters from parameters.
Since in our conceptual framework, a (proto-, pre-)genon
can be superimposed to a coding sequence, the underlying
string of nucleotides would then have to count both as an
input and as a parameter in their sense. They then speak of
an autocatalytic reaction when an object appears both as an
174 Theory Biosci. (2009) 128:171–177
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We think that our more speciﬁc terminology captures the
essential point here much better.
We are clearly aware that from a physiological per-
spective, our notion of function is inadequate, as Noble
points out. Physiological functions typically arise from the
cooperation of several proteins and other biologically rel-
evant molecules. Polypeptides are only the building blocks
of proteins. So, why do we still consider the mRNA coding
sequence for a particular polypeptide as the paradigmatic
unit of our analysis? Well, having dispensed of the issue of
inheritance, the gene then expresses the relation between
coding and basic function in the cell. As already discussed,
in line with the historical development of the concept and
because this can be clearly distinguished from other forms
of coding, we restrict ourselves to coding by nucleotides.
2
At RNA level, a speciﬁc sequence of nucleotides can
directly be functional––an issue to which we need to
return––or consist of triplets coding for a sequence of
amino acids, that is, a polypeptide, or both, because noth-
ing prevents an mRNA coding for a polypeptide to also
have some other function, for instance regulating the
expression of other RNAs. In either case, since this derived
from some coding nucleotides in the DNA via the process
of transcription, RNA processing, splicing and other
modiﬁcations, we consider this as coding for a genetic
function, and this then is where our notion of a unit of
function is originating. Thus, more precisely, we should
speak of a coding unit of function, or of a unit of coding for
a function.
Without this modiﬁcation, we loose the coherence of the
gene concept. In particular, our concept of a gene delib-
erately excludes all post-translational processes and mod-
iﬁcations, like protein folding, with or without the
assistance of chaperones. Likewise, for instance, lipids and
their biosynthesis are not contained in our concept. Lipids
are biosynthesized through the activity of certain proteins,
and this process is not directly coded for by nucleotides,
but only indirectly, as those proteins are the result of such
coding. Also, DNA by itself can have some functional role,
for instance for the spatial arrangement of gene regulation
as exposed in the uniﬁed matrix hypothesis of Scherrer or
the solenoid model of Kepes; but again, we decided to not
include that in our gene concept––even though there exist
important connections. The reason for this exclusion is
that, apparently, there is no transcription step involved, or
only indirectly via, e.g., a matrix protein recognizing DNA
motifs. Whereas the functional RNA is derived and
assembled from pieces of coding DNA, so that there is a
non-trivial relation between coding and function mediated
through an expression process,
3 there is no such mediation
for the functional DNA. Therefore, here no concept
establishing a direct relation between coding and function
via the expression pathway is needed, and we then do not
speak of a gene.
4 This implies that there is genetic infor-
mation transmitted by DNA without implying a gene
directly, for instance the mere DNA length in between sites
where regulatory proteins or RNAs may attach. In our
opinion, rather than trying to stretch the concept of a gene
to include all functionally relevant molecular structures in
the cell, it is better to limit the gene concept by the
requirement of coding through nucleotides, and to formu-
late new concepts for other types of systematic relation-
ships between molecular structures and cellular functions.
In this direction, we are presently working on the con-
ceptualization of the functional roles of spatial arrange-
ments in the cell.
For the protein coding genes, we took the polypeptide as
the unit of function (and our concept then requires that we
take any sequence coding at mRNA level for a polypeptide
as a gene, even though there do exist polypeptides that
have no cellular function and simply arise as the by-
product of some regulation mechanism, as Peter Stadler
pointed out to us). For the directly functional RNA genes, it
is not as easy to come up with a coherent deﬁnition of
function. Since experimental research on regulation by
small RNAs, for instance, is presently in rapid expansion,
we can offer at best some tentative proposal. That would
consist in considering as a functional RNA to which we
assign a gene any RNA that regularly occurs with a precise
sequence identity in a given cell. Thus, for instance when
an RNA segment has a mere spacer function so that only its
length, but not its composition is relevant for a speciﬁc
cellular task, we do not assign it a gene. This emphasizes
the coding aspect at the expense of the structural one.
Furthermore, when the function of an RNA segment is the
recognition of some regulatory RNA or protein, this does
not represent a gene for us, but rather contributes to a
genon. In any case, these are terminological decisions
which are not all strictly logically necessary and which
2 The code for the interaction between nucleotide combinations and
regulatory proteins or RNAs is relevant for the genon concept, but this
is not at issue here.
3 We fully agree with Prohaska and Stadler about the importance and
relevance of functional RNAs, even though we have not yet worked
out the details for RNA coding genes to the same extent as for protein
coding ones.
4 In this sense, the concept of a ‘‘genomic phenotype’’ suggested by
Bernardi and Bernardi, as quoted by Forsdyke, may be taken into
consideration but even though possibly correct in principle, does not
seem so helpful in our opinion. Of course, the spatial arrangement of
the genome in a functional cell can be considered as a phenotypic
character, but it is not conditioned by the DNA per se, being
determined, as everything else, from the interaction of structural
physical laws, gene products, and external factors; but here, the role
of individual genes is particularly difﬁcult to analyze.
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assign a function only to those physical objects that inﬂu-
ence the transformation of other objects), but which are
motivated by the desire to arrive at a concept that takes into
account distinct biochemical structures and the relations
between them. This relation extends our gene concept
beyond an exclusively functional deﬁnition.
But how can we then account for actual biological
functions in the cell that are based on the cooperation of
several polypeptides or genes in our sense? Well, the
answer should be obvious. What might be an elementary
function at the physiological level can nevertheless be
structurally composite. The task in analyzing such a func-
tion then is twofold: Identify the separate constituents and
describe their interactions. We admit that sometimes this
approach can encounter serious difﬁculties, when a process
produces its own constituents. Nevertheless, in the situation
relevant for the present discussion, the constituents emerge
from the expression of a coding sequence and as such can be
identiﬁed independently of the processes they are involved
in. Our concern then is the identiﬁcation of the constituents,
as opposed to their interaction networks.
This brings us also to another issue raised by Prohaska
and Stadler as well as by Gros. Genes are not expressed in
isolation from each other in a static environment, but rather
in turn interact with and modify their environment and may
regulate each other’s expression. Thus, obviously one
should think of an interactive regulatory network of gene
expression. True enough. One may consider this, however,
as a second step, the ﬁrst one (the one that we were con-
cerned with in our paper) being the identiﬁcation,
description and analysis of the elements that constitute
such networks. Again, such a procedure may not always be
possible, and many networks constitute their own elements
through their operations. Here, however, again we can
independently identify the elements and follow the path-
way from the pieces distributed across the DNA to the ﬁnal
uninterrupted coding sequence at mRNA or functional
RNA level. The various steps in the pathway may interact
and interfere with each other, and cannot always be clearly
distinguished from each other. Thus, the cascade of regu-
lation as described in our paper represents an abstraction
(as does the concept of a network, for that matter), but we
do not see a conceptual problem here. Here, we view it as
an operative elementary system included in such networks.
For instance, genon and pregenon and their respective
contributions may well overlap. The RNA molecule at the
various stages of the expression process can interact with
itself, for instance directly through RNA folding, or indi-
rectly through the cellular environment, by causing or
inhibiting the production of elements needed for later
stages, or simply by using up certain cellular resources. As
the existence of retrogenes shows, sometimes the
expression process can also be reverted into the opposite
direction.
Obviously, our analysis of the expression of individual
genes needs to be complemented by an analysis of the
regulatory interaction of different genes. In fact, it seems
that our conceptual approach is also useful for modelling
the coordinated co-regulation of ensembles of genes. In this
direction, presently, we are working out the co-regulation
of groups of genes via the combinatorics of the genon and
the trans-genon. In more abstract terms, it remains to be
seen whether our analysis of the temporal process of the
expression of single genes can be complemented by an
analysis of the simultaneous interaction of several genes
and genons that are possibly at different stages of expres-
sion. In our opinion, however, the regulation and expres-
sion of individual genes, and the interactions between
different genes and their regulation are complementary
aspects, and in contrast to Prohaska and Stadler, we do not
think that it is useful to play these aspects out against each
other. Here, perhaps the comparison with a rather different
science, linguistics, might be insightful. Already de Saus-
sure clariﬁed the relationship between diachronic and
synchronic approaches to linguistic phenomena. One can
analyze the diachronic development of the pronunciation
and the meaning of words, or one can investigate the
synchronic relationship between the words in a language.
Also, for the latter, one can consider the syntagmatic
relationship and the functional interaction between the
different words in a sentence, or one can consider the
paradigmatic relationship between those words that can
assume the same syntactic or semantic role in a given
sentence. Similar principles constitute the basis of the
structuralist approach to phonology. The former is about
mutual inﬂuences, as in regulatory networks, the latter is
about mutual exclusion as in the expression of individual
genes. In linguistics, one therefore needs, and linguists
have developed concepts for both aspects individually,
instead of requesting that a single concept should capture
both of them simultaneously.
Also, a gene, as represented by the mRNA coding
sequence prior to translation into a polypeptide or by a
functional RNA sequence, and its genon need not be
materially distinct. One and the same nucleotide in an RNA
can contribute both to the coding and the regulation.
Nevertheless, since these are distinct roles and since these
roles are (usually) exercised at different times, they can be
conceptually separated. The same also applies to the fact
known at least since the operon model of Jacob and Monod
that DNA regulatory elements (which would be part of a
proto-genon in our terminology) may well be contained in
transcribed regions.
Since we do not identify a gene with any kind of locus in
the DNA determined by spatial proximity or any other
176 Theory Biosci. (2009) 128:171–177
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functional product, we do not see any difﬁculty with trans-
splicing or similar phenomena. The coding sequence in the
mRNA is assembled from different pieces with different
provenience in the DNA, as also emphasized by Stadler
et al. These pieces may or may not be contained within a
single ORF. The characteristic aspect of our formal anal-
ysis is that it operates in both directions, forward, by asking
to what functional products a speciﬁc piece of DNA is
contributing, and backward, by asking where the pieces
that together constitute a sequence coding for a functional
product are originating from in the DNA. Therefore, in
most cases, a gene in our sense cannot be identiﬁed with a
localized stretch of DNA. We realize that this poses a
problem for gene annotations as these are typically based
on DNA sequence analysis. This problem, however, is not
the result of arbitrary terminological decisions on our side,
but is already made inevitable by the mechanism of alter-
native splicing. In fact, already the old phenomenon of
giant transcripts discovered by Scherrer poses problems for
gene annotations, and this issue is now receiving attention
in the context of the ENCODE project. Therefore, Stadler
et al. also address this issue in detail.
The problem that remains is the analysis of the relation
between the linear arrangement of coding and noncoding
pieces of DNA and the regulatory networks that produce
the functional molecules in the cell, an issue raised by
Prohaska and Stadler and by Gros. Our analysis hopes to
lay some conceptual foundations that will help in this
direction, but we are certainly aware that this is a real
problem that cannot be solved by terminological proposals
alone.
This point was not extensively commented on, although
by necessity underlying this discussion, but it may foster
further investigation and comprehension of still enigmatic
facts concerning genome and gene expression. In conclu-
sion the question may be asked to what extent the com-
mentaries received and the discussion arising shall
inﬂuence further elaboration of the gene and genon con-
cept. A major point not contested seems to be the
possibility to apply information-theoretic analysis to gene
expression on the basis of a separation of information for
product and regulation, although our mathematical elabo-
ration was not discussed extensively in the comments
received. Within the frame of actual molecular genetics it
may be important that the gene and genon concept gives
hints to eventual comprehension of the size of genome and
transcripts in higher eukaryotes.
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